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SECURITIES LAW
INTRODUCTION
From September 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth decided three cases substantially ad-
dressing securities law. Blinder v. Stellatos' focused on timely filing re-
quirements in a liquidation proceeding, and whether notice, given the
circumstances, satisfied due process. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc.2
addressed fraudulent misrepresentation claims, primary liability, and
"control person" liability. In Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,3 the
court decided a section 11 claim, the adequacy of a section 10(b) claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)," and the statute of limitations
applicable to federal securities claims. Relevant to these issues, this sur-
vey will present background information regarding the state of the law,
the decisions of the Tenth Circuit, holdings in other circuits, and analyses
of the court of appeal's decisions.
I. LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE SECURITY INVESTOR
PROTECTION ACT: NOTICE & FILING REQUIREMENTS
A. Background
In a liquidation proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1971Y (SIPA), many investors will have interests at stake. These
investors are entitled to due process, including the important element of
notice. The trustee in a bankruptcy or liquidation proceeding is the party
obligated to provide sufficient notice to allow these investors to present
their claims.6 Further, investors are required to adhere to filing require-
ments regarding presentation of a claim in liquidation proceedings under
the SIPA.'
The central issue when evaluating the sufficiency of notice given by
the trustee is due process! Due process requires notice reasonably cal-
culated to apprise all interested parties of the pending action, thereby
1. 124 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1997).
2. 144 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 1998).
3. 124 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1994). According to legislative history, SIPA's purpose is to provide
protection to customers against losses that might occur when a securities broker-dealer suffers finan-
cial failure. See S. REP. No. 95-763, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 764, 764.
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a)(l).
7. See id. § 78fff-2(a)(3) ("No claim of a customer or other creditor of the debtor which is
received by the trustee after the expiration of the six-month period beginning on the date of publica-
tion of notice.., shall be allowed ... ").
8. Cf. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) ("Elementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... .
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allowing interested parties the opportunity to present their claims.9 Ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' the reasonableness and constitutional va-
lidity of the chosen method of notice can be defended on the ground it is
reasonably certain to inform interested parties."
Thus, the next step is determining what form of notice will satisfy
the requirements of reasonable notice explained in Mullane. One issue in
Mullane was whether notice by publication alone was sufficient to allow
interested parties to present their claims.'2 The Court held that publication
by itself, typically, does not constitute sufficient notice." The Court,
however, recognized that notice by publication is acceptable when it is
"supplemental to other action which in itself may reasonably be expected
to convey a warning."' Notice by mail is one form of notice that courts
agree is reasonable to allow interested parties to present their claims."
According to Mullane, due process requires notice be sent to interested
parties with known addresses.'" Finally, numerous courts have held no-
tice by mail, supplemented by other forms of notice such as publication
9. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
10. While Mullane arose in the context of a common trust fund, the Supreme Court's holding
has not been limited to the facts of that case.
[Mullane] generally is recognized as the keystone of modern philosophy regarding the
notice requirement and its importance should not be underestimated. In a series of cases
decided since Mullane, the Supreme Court has made it clear that notice to defendant must
measure up to the standards set forth in that case in all types of actions.
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1074, at
465 (2d ed. 1987) (citing Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)).
11. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
12. See id.
13. See id. ("It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed here, is a reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts."). However,
the Court notes an exception to this rule, stating, "[tihis court has not hesitated to approve of resort
to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible
or practicable to give more adequate warning." See id. at 317; cf 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
10, § 1074, at 461-62 (explaining that service by publication will only be sufficient "when it is used
to serve an absent domiciliary who cannot be served in any other way.").
14. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316.
15. See id. at 319 (discussing the inadequacy of providing notice by publication alone when it
is possible to notify parties by other means, and further stating "the mails today are recognized as an
efficient and inexpensive means of communication."); cf 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, §
1074 (stating that notice by mail is sufficient under due process, however, also citing Bonita Packing
Co. v. O'Sullivan, 165 F.R.D. 610 (D.C. Cal. 1995), where notice by mail was deemed insufficient).
16. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318 ("Where the names and... addresses of those affected by a
proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise
them of its pendency."); cf. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (stating
that when name and address are reasonably ascertainable, notice by mail insures actual notice).
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in national newspapers, will generally satisfy due process, even when the
interested party does not actually receive notice."
The courts have established extensive caselaw regarding what con-
stitutes acceptable notice under the requirements of due process. To
comply with these well-established requirements, the SIPA expressly
requires that:
Promptly after the appointment of the trustee, such trustee shall
cause notice of the commencement... to be published in one or more
newspapers of general circulation in the form and manner determined
by the court, and at the same time shall cause a copy of such notice to
be mailed to each person who, from the books and records of the
debtor, appears to have been a customer... with an open account
within the past twelve months, to the address of such person as it ap-
pears from the books and records of the debtor.... ,
Thus, SIPA clearly requires notice by mail, supplemented with notice
published in one or more newspapers.
Another important aspect in liquidation proceedings under the SIPA
is the section governing the time frame in which investors must file their
claims. The Act requires that claims must be filed within six months
from the date of notice, and no claims will be allowed after such date. 9
This statutory requirement, however, provides an exception for incom-
petent persons without guardians.' While some courts have attempted to
allow extensions based on equitable grounds," such decisions have been
reversed in favor of the requirement that requests for extensions must be
made within the six-month period.' Therefore, the six-month period for
17. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17
F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994); Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 649, 652 (2d Cir.
1988); Nelson v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 863, 868-69 (D. Md. 1997); Scott
v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 381, 387 (D.D.C. 1996); Pou v. United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, 923 F. Supp. 573, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aftid, Pou v. Loszynski, 107 E3d 3 (2d Cir. 1997);
United States v. Franklin, 897 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D. Or. 1995).
18. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a)(1) (1994).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff-2(a)(3) ("No claim of a customer or other creditor of the debtor
which is received by the trustee after the expiration of the six-month period beginning on the date of
publication of notice ... shall be allowed .... ).
20. See id. ("[T]he court may, upon application within such period [six month time frame] and
for cause shown, grant a reasonable, fixed extension of time for the filing of a claim by the United
States, by a State or political subdivision thereof, or by an infant or incompetent person without a
guardian.").
21. Cf, e.g., Gov't Secs. Corp. v. Morey, 107 B.R. 1012, 1022 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (involving a
situation where the bankruptcy court in error allowed a late claim based on "fairness and equity");
Gov't Secs. Corp. v. Carson, 95 B.R. 829, 832 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that the allowance of a late
claim in an attempt to reconcile the SIPA with sections of the bankruptcy code was in error).
22. See Morey, 107 B.R. at 1022; Carson, 95 B.R. at 833 (explaining that even if the late
claimant was an incompetent person under the act, allowing a late claim was not possible because an
extension was not requested within the six-month time period).
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filing claims is deemed an absolute rule by the courts, and failure to file a
claim within this period results in exclusion of the claim.'
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Blinder Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos4
1. Facts
Blinder Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos addressed the sufficiency of
notice given by the trustee after three separate investors filed late claims.
When assessing the correctness of the district court's decision, which
allowed the investor's claims, the Tenth Circuit applied the same stan-
dard of review exercised by the district court when it evaluated the bank-
ruptcy court's decision.' The applicable standard was whether the lower
court's decision was clearly erroneous.'
Blinder, Robinson & Company, Inc. (hereinafter "debtor") filed a
voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code on July 31, 1990. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
then applied to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado for
protection under SIPA.' As a result of the filing, the district court ap-
pointed a trustee and removed the case to bankruptcy court.' The bank-
ruptcy court subsequently ordered the trustee to mail notice to each in-
vestor who maintained an open account with the debtor during the past
twelve months and to publish notice in twenty-six newspapers through-
out the country)0 The notice informed individuals of the six-month rule
for filing claims under section 78fff-2(a).3 Under this six-month rule, all
claims filed after February 14, 1991, were considered late'.3
Three investors filed claims after the bar date of February 14, 1991,
for various reasons; as a result, the trustee rejected these claims.' The
bankruptcy court did not agree with the rejection of the claims by the
trustee and ordered the claims be treated like claims timely filed.' The
23. See, e.g., Morey, 107 B.R. at 1022; Miller v. Austin, 72 B.R. 893, 894, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Secs. Investor Protection Corp. v. J. Shapiro Co., 414 F. Supp. 679, 680, 683 (D. Minn.
1975); Weis Secs. Inc. v. Borghi, 411 F. Supp. 194, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 513
(2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 353 F. Supp. 496,497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Adler,
Coleman Clearing Corp., 204 B.R. 99, 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re OTC Net, Inc., 34 B.R.
658,659-60 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
24. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos, 124 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1997).
25. See Stellanos, 124 F.3d at 1241.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1239.
28. See id.
29. See id. (requiring appointment of trustee for the liquidation under 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3)




33. See id. at 1239-40.
34. See id. at 1240.
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bankruptcy court found that the trustee's publication of notice and mail-
ings were reasonable, but that the three investors never received actual or
constructive notice of the proceedings concerning the debtor.3 The bank-
ruptcy court held the investors rebutted the presumption of actual receipt
of notice, and each of the claims should be considered along with the
timely-filed claims.' Further, the bankruptcy court accepted the assertion
by each investor that they did not receive constructive notice because
they had not read the newspaper during the six-month period." Accord-
ing to the bankruptcy court, based on the absence of actual or construc-
tive notice, application of the SIPA to each of the investors who filed late
claims would be unconstitutional."
On appeal, the district court did not analyze the case under due pro-
cess, but held the mailed notice was inadequate with regard to two of the
investors.39 Further, with respect to one claim, the court found the incom-
petent person exception was applicable.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the bankruptcy court's finding that
each investor was mailed a customer claim packet, and the trustee suc-
cessfully published notice in twenty-six newspapers throughout the
country." The court of appeals found the bankruptcy court's findings to
be reasonable and logical. '2 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's holding of clear error in the bankruptcy court's finding that
sufficient notice occurred.' Further, the court of appeals found that even
though two of the investors' names did not appear on a list of mailings
subsequent to the original mailing, such evidence did not invalidate the
bankruptcy court's decision that the two investors were mailed notice in
the original mailing."
The Tenth Circuit then analyzed the sufficiency of notice under the
requirements of due process. Although the district court decided not to
analyze the case under due process,' the court of appeals held the mail-
ing of notice and the supplemental publication of notice in twenty-six
newspapers was sufficient. ' Based on the court of appeal's holding that
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1240-41.






43. See id. at 1242.
44. See id.
45. See id. (stating that the district court did not address the issue and affirming on other
grounds).
46. See id. at 1243 (finding that the combination of mailing and publication in 26 newspapers
to be a reasonable method of notification).
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the trustee's methods of notice were reasonable, the combination of no-
tice by mail and publication was "reasonably calculated to apprise inter-
ested parties of the SIPA liquidation and afford them an opportunity to
be heard." 7
Finally, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the six-month time requirement
for interested parties to file claims. Citing extensive authority, the court
of appeals decided that the six-month time period was an absolute re-
quirement." The only relevant exception under the circumstances of this
case was for an "incompetent person without a guardian." 9 Although one
investor was in a car accident, the court of appeals held she was still re-
quired to file for an extension of time within the six-month period and
her failure to file resulted in a late claim." Therefore, the court of appeals
found that the district court's holding that the investor's late filed claim
fell under the exception to the six-month requirement was "contrary to
the plain language of the statute.""
C. Other Circuits
Regarding the requirement of due process, the Second, Ninth, and
District of Columbia Circuits are in accord with the Tenth Circuit's ap-
proach,5 and do not require the party to actually receive notice in order to
satisfy due process. 3 For instance, the Second Circuit held that with the
existence of supplemental mailings, as in Blinder, the risk of non-receipt
is constitutionally acceptable.'
Decisions among the various circuits regarding the six-month time
requirement in the SIPA are also in accord with the Tenth Circuit's rec-
ognition of an absolute rule. The Second Circuit denied late claims even
though there was a lack of actual receipt of notice.5 Further, other district
courts and bankruptcy courts. agree with the Tenth Circuit's interpreta-
tion. In Florida, a district court held that the six-month time requirement
is absolute, allowing no exceptions to the rule through application of
equitable considerations.' A New York district court held the six-month
47. Id.
48. See supra 23 and accompanying text.
49. Blinder, 124 F.3d at 1243.
50. See id. at 1243-44.
51. Id. at 1244.
52. See id. at 1243; see also United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Nelson v.
Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Md. 1997); Scott v. United States, 950
F. Supp. 381, 387 (D.D.C. 1996); Pou v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency, 923 F. Supp.
573, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
54. See Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646,649,652 (2d Cir. 1988).
55. See Weis Secs., Inc. v. Borghi, 411 F. Supp. 194, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd 538 F.2d
513 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. See Gov't Secs. Corp. v. Morey, 107 B.R. 1012, 1022 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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requirement was an "absolute outer limit,"' and a district court in Minne-
sota also found the six-month rule to be absolute, holding the receipt of
actual notice was immaterial. 8 Finally, bankruptcy decisions in New
York and Colorado are in accord, holding that the six-month rule of sec-
tion 78fff-2(a)(3) is an absolute bar."'
D. Analysis
Based on the holdings of various courts,' it is evident the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeal's holding is in accord with current approaches
throughout the judicial jurisdictions. With regard to the requirements of
reasonable notice, notice by mail, when supplemented with other pub-
lished notice, is sufficient to satisfy due process." The purpose of notice
is to apprise interested parties of the pending proceeding, allowing them
the opportunity to present their claims. 2 In Blinder, the complaining par-
ties were mailed notice and notice was also published in twenty-six
newspapers. Only a certain degree of notice can be given within reason:
other factors such as cost, inconvenience, court delays, and the interests
of other investors are relevant in cases where many investors are in-
volved.' The resulting delays, if each individual were given additional
notice, would contradict the basic notice requirement that only notice
reasonably certain to apprise interested parties of a proceeding is neces-
sary. There is no requirement that parties are entitled to perfect notice. In
fact, the reasonableness and constitutional validity of such notice is
judged by whether it is reasonably certain to inform interested parties.'
Additionally, the resulting delays of providing further notice would
adversely impact the rights of other investors with claims. The purpose
of the six-month requirement under the SIPA is to expedite liquidation
proceedings and allow investors to get on with their financial endeav-
ors.' The longer an investor's money is tied up in a liquidation proceed-
57. SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 353 F. Supp. 496,497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. J. Shapiro Co., 414 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D.
Minn. 1975).
59. See In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 204 B.R. 99, 103 (Bankr. S+D.N.Y. 1997);
Miller v. Austin, 72 B.R. 893, 896-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re OTC Net, Inc., 34 B.R. 658, 660
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
60. See supra text accompanying note 17.
61. Cf Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1988) (after sending
notice "reasonably calculated to inform" of forthcoming foreclosure action, the court found no
further requirement to send notices for each subsequent step in the proceedings).
62. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950).
63. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 ("This court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publi-
cation as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or
practicable to give more adequate warning.").
64. See id. at 314-15.
65. See generally Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat.
1636, 1637, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 5263, 5264 ("[I]t is in the interests of customers of a debtor that
securities held for their account be distributed to them as rapidly as possible in order to minimize the
period during which they are unable to trade and consequently are at risk of market fluctuations.").
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ing, the greater the chance that investor will be subjected to fluctuations
in the market.' One cannot expect a court to continue giving additional
notice, delaying a case and jeopardizing the interests of the many other
investors that fulfilled the filing requirements. As mentioned previously,
the key factor is whether the notice given is reasonable to apprise inter-
ested parties of a liquidation proceeding. The combination of notice by
mail and publication and the six-month requirement for filing a claim is a
reasonable method, producing an effective balance between the interests
of the investors and the state when resolving liquidation proceedings.
II. CONTROL PERSON AND PRIMARY LIABILITY
A. Background
In cases involving alleged violations under section 15 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (1933 Act)67 and section 20(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act),' one of the central issues revolves
around the determination of control person liability. When a person con-
trols another individual who violates securities laws, that person can be
held jointly and severally liable under section 15 of the 1933 Acte and
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act." Section 15 of the 1933 Act states, in part,
that a person who
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title [sec-
tions 11 or 12], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to
the extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is al-
leged to exist.7
Under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such con-
trolled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts consti-
tuting the violation or cause of action.72
66. See id.
67. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(o)
(1994)).
68. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1994)).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77(o).





Based on the above sections of the statute, the relevant question is
whether an individual is liable as a control person. To assert a prima fa-
cie case for control person liability, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
requires the plaintiff to show, "(1) a primary violation of the securities
laws and (2) 'control' over the primary violator by the alleged control-
ling person."" In cases of control person liability, "once the plaintiff es-
tablishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
lack of culpable participation or knowledge."'7
The Tenth Circuit expressly disagrees with the view that it is neces-
sary for a "plaintiff to show the defendant actually or culpably partici-
pated in the primary violation."" This test, employed by a minority of the
courts, requires a plaintiff to prove actual or culpable participation in
addition to control.'6
The prima facie case required by the Tenth Circuit, including the
eventual burden shift to the defendant, conforms with the approach taken
by the majority of the circuits." The circuits are split, however, on the
issue of what must be proven to allege "control." The two different ap-
proaches involve whether it is necessary to prove the controlling person
(1) actually exercised control over the primary violator's general affairs,
or (2) simply had the power to control the general affairs of the primary
violator."8
In 1985, the Tenth Circuit addressed control person liability in San
Francisco-Okla. Petroleum Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co."' While control was
an issue in the case, the court was satisfied that the defendant was sig-
nificantly involved in the corporation and was thus a controlling person'
Consequently, the court did not specifically address what degree of con-
trol is necessary, and instead focused on whether the defendant's lack of
knowledge exempted him from liability." The court, however, did state
that "[iut seems apparent that [the defendant] had the authority and the
power to control although he may not have sought to exercise the
73. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1998).
74. Maher, 144 F.3d at 1305 (citing San Francisco-Okla. Petroleum Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co.,
765 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1985)).
75. Id. (quoting First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
76. Cf. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[A] plaintiff must
show a primary violation by the controlled person and control of the primary violator by the targeted
defendant"). For further discussion of this rule, see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Con-
trolling Person Liability Under 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities
Act, 53 Bus. LAW 1, 9, 20-26 (1997).
77. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 6.
78. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8.
79. 765 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1985).
80. See Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d at 964 (explaining that the defendant was heavily involved in
the affairs of the business, was a director, and was the sole shareholder).
81. See id. at 964-65.
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power."8 Overall, the court implicitly appeared to acknowledge indirect
control, but did not clarify what degree of control is necessary.
The Tenth Circuit also addressed control person liability in First
Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring,"3 finding the defendant was at least in
a position of indirect control based on various factors. Once again, the
court failed to specifically discuss what degree of control was necessary
and only found the defendant was possibly a controlling person." Thus,
the degree of control necessary in the Tenth Circuit is unclear from these
cases addressing control person liability.
Another claim an investor might bring is primary civil liability un-
der section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933." An individual is primar-
ily liable if he or she "offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e
of this title."' Additionally, an individual can also be primarily liable
under section 12(1) for improper solicitation of the purchase of securi-
ties."
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc.'
1. Facts
The plaintiff, William J. Maher, claimed defendants, Colina Oro
Molino, Inc. ("COM") and Gwen Fraser, were liable as control persons
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts for securities violations committed by
Durango," the company that issued the stock at the center of this dis-
pute.' The plaintiff first alleged primary violations of section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, and sections 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act by the de-
fendants.9 ' Further allegations against the defendants were as follows:
(1) Fraser was the sister of Tatman, who Maher alleged was "an offi-
cer or employee of Defendant Durango Metals and/or Defendant
COM, Inc." and the general manager of the Gold Hill Mill, owned by
COM; (2) Fraser was the sole or principal owner of COM; (3) both
82. Id. at 965.
83. 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992) rev'd on other grounds, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
84. See Pring, 969 F.2d at 898 (explaining that the evidence presented was enough to prevent
sumrnnary judgment against the plaintiffs, but that further determination was necessary and the issue
was remanded to the district court).
85. 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (1994)).
86. Id. (referring to section 77e which addresses prohibitions relating to interstate commerce
and the mail).
87. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988) (stating liability will continue to an individ-
ual "who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own
financial interests or those of the securities owner").
88. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1303 (10th Cir. 1998).
89. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1303.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1304-05.
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COM and Fraser had access to information relating to Durango that
was not available to the public; and (4) pursuant to a Memorandum of
Contract.... COM purchased from Durango "a sufficient amount of
outstanding stock to request a position on their Board of Directors"
and "has the option to acquire [a] controlling interest" in Durango.9
Plaintiff's claims also alleged violations of various sections of the Colo-
rado Securities Act.93
Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions induced him to invest in Durango.' The misrepresentations alleged
by plaintiff were that Tatman and Hartley, allegedly an officer and di-
rector of Durango, said they were involved in Durango along with Fraser
and COM, and Durango was a "good potential investment."'9 The plain-
tiff further alleged he was denied access to Durango's financial records,
that he had not received a dividend promised to him, and that he de-
manded and never received the return of his investment."
The district court dismissed plaintiff's section 10(b), section
12(a)(1), and section 12(a)(2) claims as a matter of law, concluding that
Fraser and COM were not liable as control persons for Durango's alleged
violations.' Further, plaintiffs failure to allege Fraser and COM were
"sellers of the stock at issue" precluded a finding of primary liability
under section 12(a) of the 1933 Act, and failed to show how the "finan-
cial interests of [the] defendants related to the sale."" The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed only the purported violations under the 1933
and 1934 Acts.
2. Decision
a. Control Person Liability
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit cited its previous decision in
Richardson v. MacArthur, which held that the 1934 Act was remedial
and should be construed liberally.9 This decision held a requirement of
some indirect influence, but not actual direction, was necessary to find
controlling person liability." Analyzing the plaintiffs complaint, the
appellate court found the alleged primary violations of the 1933 and
1934 Acts enough to satisfy the first element of a prima facie case.''
92. id. at 1305.
93. See id. at 1303 (referring to The Colorado Securities Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-
125(1), repealed by Laws 1990, H.B. 90-1222, § 1, effective July 1, 1990).
94. See id. at 1303-04.
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However, the court found the plaintiffs allegations, even when viewed
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, fell short of establishing COM's
control over Durango (the second element of a prima facie case)."2 The
court concluded the plaintiff only established a tenuous connection be-
tween COM and Durango and failed to prove COM was a control person
in'any way." Thus, the court dismissed the allegation of control person
liability against COM because the plaintiff did not allege COM's power
to control Durango, but simply alleged COM's ability to acquire that
power." Consequently, the court declined to address "whether a plaintiff
must allege actual control of or simply the power to control the primary
violator's general affairs in order to establish a prima facie case of con-
trol person liability."'" Further, the court of appeals held that although
the determination of control person liability is a question of fact, the
court can dismiss the claim when, based on the allegations, it cannot be
reasonably inferred the defendant was a control person."°
The court also found the plaintiffs allegations of control person
liability against Fraser (Fraser's control of Durango) were insufficient."
The plaintiffs claims that Fraser had an ownership interest in COM, and
that Fraser's brother was an officer or employee of Durango were simply
not enough to demonstrate control person liability." Thus, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs section 10(b),
section 12(a)(1), and section 12(a)(2) claims under sections 15 or 20(a)
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts against COM and Fraser based on control
person liability.'
b. Primary Liability Under Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act
Under section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, a person is liable if he or
she "'offers or sells a security' in violation of the registration require-
ment of § 5.""' Further, according to the United States Supreme Court,
"§ 12(a)(1) liability is not limited to the person who passes title to the
securities, but extends 'to the person who successfully solicits the pur-
chase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial
interests or those of the securities owner.""" The district court dismissed
this claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that COM or Fraser were
"sellers" of the Durango stock, and failed to establish the financial inter-
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1305-06.
104. See id. at 1306 n.8.
105. Id.




110, Id. at 1307 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (1994)).
111. Id. (quoting Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988)).
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ests of either COM or Fraser regarding the sale."2 Because the plaintiff
did not claim COM and Fraser sold the stock, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish solicitation by COM and Fraser, and their financial
interests, to support the claim."3 The appellate court, however, held the
plaintiff failed to allege the necessary facts in his complaint regarding
such solicitation, resulting in failure of the primary liability claim."'
C. Other Circuits
1. Control Person Liability
a. Majority Rule/Test
Under the majority test, after the plaintiff proves control by the
controlling person and a primary violation of securities laws by the con-
trolled person, the burden shifts to the defendant (controlling person) to
prove his or her defense."5 However, the various circuits are in disagree-
ment regarding what evidence is necessary to state a prima facie case for
control person liability. This split is focused on determining the meaning
of the term "control." The question is whether it is necessary for the
plaintiff to prove "the alleged control person actually exercised control
over the primary violator's general affairs, or whether it is sufficient to
show the control person had the power to exercise such control.""6
The Eighth Circuit held that in order to state a prima facie case of
control person liability, the alleged control person must actually exercise
control over the primary violator's operations."7 The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the Eighth Circuit, and applied the same test regarding con-
trol person liability."' Overall, the test established by the Eighth Circuit
is the most commonly used test to determine control."'
The test established by the Eleventh Circuit requires only that the
plaintiff show the alleged control person had the power to control the
general affairs of the primary violator to state a prima facie case of con-
trol person liability." The Fifth Circuit adopts a test virtually identical to
the Eleventh Circuit test.'
2 '
While there is some disagreement, the majority of the circuits agree




115. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 6.
116. Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8.
117. See id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1985)).
118. See id. (citing Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992)).
119. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 14.
120. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8 (citing Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 &
n.6 (I Ith Cir. 1996)).
121. See id. (citing Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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the transaction underlying the alleged securities violation rather than
proving actual use of that power to satisfy the requirements of a prima
facie case."
b. Minority Rule/Test
The minority test is referred to as the culpable participation test. In
addition to proving the control element, the plaintiff is also required to
prove "culpable participation" by the controlling person regarding the
primary violation." While the Third Circuit clearly follows this test,
some commentators believe the Second Circuit is steering away from the
minority test.' There is even stronger evidence the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits are moving, or have moved, toward the majority rule that does
not require proof of actual or culpable participation. "
2. Primary Liability Under Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act
The court of appeals found the allegations in the plaintiff's com-
plaint insufficient to satisfy the requirements for stating a prima facie
case of primary liability under section 12(a)(1). 6 The plaintiff did not
allege that COM or Fraser sold the stock, thus, the only way to state a
prima facie case was to allege and support a claim of solicitation. 7 The
court found the plaintiff failed to do so. The court drew support for its
position based on a holding in the First Circuit'" and a decision in a dis-
trict court in northern California."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the question of control person li-
ability in this case, dismissing plaintiffs claims based on the insuffi-
ciency of the complaint.'" In the complaint, the plaintiff failed to show
that COM or Fraser even possessed the power to control Durango. Thus,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals left open the question of "whether a
122. See id. at 1306 n.8.
123. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996); Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
124. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 24. But see Maher, 144 F.3d at 1306 n.8
(citing First Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1472 (stating generally that to establish a prima facie case of control
person liability, a plaintiff must show that the alleged control person was in some sense a meaningful
participant in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person)).
125. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 76, at 25-26.
126. See Maher, 144 F.3d at 1307.
127. See id.
128. See id. (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir. 1996) (conclud-
ing dismissal of section 12(2) claim under Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate)).
129. See id. (citing In re Words of Wonder Secs. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1427, 1435 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (dismissing, with leave to amend, section 12(2) claims because plaintiffs failed to allege facts
demonstrating that defendants "solicited" the purchase of the relevant securities)).
130. See id. at 1306&n.8.
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plaintiff must allege actual control of or simply the power to control the
primary violator's general affairs in order to establish a prima facie case
of control person liability."'3 ' While the Tenth Circuit's requirements for
stating a prima facie case fall under the majority rule, the court chose not
to decide what evidence would suffice when alleging control.
The distinction between the two views regarding control are
whether actual control or just the power to control the general affairs of
the primary violator is necessary to satisfy the control element of the
prima facie case. The majority approach requiring actual control by the
alleged control person over the primary violator's general affairs appears
to be the better choice. It would be inequitable to hold the alleged control
person jointly liable for the acts of the primary violator, based solely on
the power to control the general affairs of the primary violator. By re-
quiring actual control for a prima facie case, liability will only extend to
those control persons who actually participated in the affairs of the pri-
mary violator, rather than holding a potentially innocent party liable
based on the power to control.
Although the Maher court declined to specifically decide the issue,
it appears at least arguable that the court is leaning in the direction of
only requiring the power to control the general affairs of the primary
violator. In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cites a prior
case where it construed the statute liberally, further stating a requirement
of "only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual
direction to hold a 'controlling person' liable."'' The Maher court then
reiterated that summary judgment in favor of the defendant is inappropri-
ate when the defendant is in a position of at least indirect control over
two companies that together control the primary violator.' Based on
language in Maher, advocating a liberal approach, one can formulate the
argument that the Tenth Circuit would not require proof of actual control
by the controlling person over the primary violator's general affairs.
III. RELATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 10(B) SECURITY EXCHANGE ACTS
(1933 AND 1934) CLAIMS TO F.R.C.P. 9(B) AND THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR A FEDERAL SECURITIES CLAIM
A. Background
When pleading securities fraud, the particularity requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'" often become an issue. Regarding
a section 11 Securities Act claim, "a plaintiff who 'purchased a security
131. Id. at 1306.
132. Id. at 1302 (quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967)).
133. See id. at 1305.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally.").
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issued pursuant to a registration statement... need only show a material
misstatement or omission to establish [a] prima facie case. Liability
against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even for innocent
misstatements.""35 However, courts addressing section 11 claims have
held that because section 11 claims are not necessarily based on fraud,
the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) are inapplicable." Finally, a
plaintiff can sue various parties for misrepresentations, or misleading
statements, assuming the plaintiff who purchased the securities did not
have knowledge of the false or misleading statement, or omission at the
time of the acquisition.""
In regard to section 10(b) claims, Rule 9(b) requires the claim to
include identification of circumstances constituting fraud."8 The com-
plaint must also include time, place, and contents of the false representa-
tion, identity of the party making the false statements, and consequences
of such statements.'39 The complaint must state the identity of each party
in relation to each statement made.'" The purpose of requiring parties to
comply with Rule 9(b) in securities cases is to protect the defendant's
business reputation from unsupported fraud claims.'"' Additionally, the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) also provide specific notice re-
garding which acts of the defendant are related to the fraud claim.' 2
Finally, the statute of limitations for a federal securities claim is one
year.'' This period is measured from the point the plaintiff has notice of
the violation, and extends for one year from such notice."
135. Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)).
136. See 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1490 (1993). Compare Schoenfeld
v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding Rule 9(b) inapplicable to a
section 1 claim), with Stac Elec. Sec. Litig. v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
Rule 9(b) requirements applicable when the claims are grounded in fraud).
137. See Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994)). The
statute states the ability to sue applies to
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every person who was a di-
rector of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of
the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to which his liability is as-
serted; (3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as
being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or part-
ner;... (5) every underwriter with respect to such security ....
Id.
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
139. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1-252 (quoting Lawrence Nat'l Bank v. Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176,
180 (10th Cir. 1991)).
140. See id. at 1253 (citing Ednonds, 924 F.2d at 180; Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 800
F.2d 1008, 1011 (loth Cir. 1986)).
141. See 69A AM. JuR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1490 (1993).
142. See id.
143. Cf Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 908 (codified as amended at 15




B. Tenth Circuit Case-Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc."5
1. Facts
Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of himself, and others similarly situ-
ated, against Celestial Seasonings, Inc. (Celestial) and other defendants
for violations of securities laws.'" In July 1993, Celestial "issued ap-
proximately two million shares of stock in an initial public offering
(hereinafter 'IPO'). W'4 7 At the time, Celestial was the largest manufacturer
and marketer of herbal teas in the United States.'" The IPO Prospectus
stated Celestial was preparing to introduce a new ready-to-drink tea to
the market."'4 The IPO also stated this venture would include an agree-
ment with Perrier (Perrier Agreement), which gave Perrier the exclusive
rights to make and sell the product in the United States and Canada.'
In January 1994, Celestial made a secondary public offering (SPO),
again referring to the Perrier Agreement.'' In May 1994, Celestial an-
nounced that discussions were under way to amend or terminate the Per-
rier Agreement. ' After this announcement, Celestial stock prices began
to fall.'
53
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, Celestial,
Celestial insiders, and the underwriters for the IPO and SPO, issued
statements leading investors to conclude
that Celestial would be able to utilize Perrier's manufacturing, mar-
keting, and distributing capabilities to sell its [ready-to-drink or
"RTD"] teas in the United States and Canada; that the Perrier Agree-
ment would enhance Celestial's position as a specialty beverage
company, increase the availability of its products at convenience
stores, wholesale clubs, restaurants and food service operations, and
allow it to further capitalize on its high brand awareness and on the
growth in the RTD market; that Perrier, having promoted Celestial's
RTD teas in test markets, would be selling Celestial's RTD products
in fourteen major metropolitan markets in the Summer of 1993; and
that a joint venture between Perrier's parent Nestle, and Coca-Cola
would not adversely impact the Perrier Agreement.'
5 '
Further, plaintiff alleged defendants' knowing and reckless disregard of
numerous facts. These facts included that Perrier's distribution system
was incompatible with the sale of RTD teas, that Perrier would have to
145. Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, (10th Cir. 1997).
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spend large amounts of money to adapt this system to market RTD teas,
that Perrier was not in a position to focus its time and efforts on market-
ing Celestial's product, that Nestle's arrangement with Coca-Cola was
interfering with Perrier's agreement with Celestial, and that Celestial
would not be able to afford the shelf space necessary for expansion based
on the limited distribution of teas under the Perrier Agreement." Based
on these allegatibns, plaintiff claimed
(1) primary liability for direct violations of § 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 and § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (in-
cluding Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10(b)(5) promul-
gated thereunder); and (2) secondary liability of 'control persons' for
violations of § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act."
6
The district court eventually dismissed plaintiffs claims. The court
found the sections 11 and 10(b) claims were based on fraud, and the
complaint failed to satisfy the particularized pleading requirement of
Rule 9(b)."'7 The court held the complaint insufficiently identified "the
circumstances constituting fraud upon which his various securities claims
rely." '" Further, the district court found cross-referencing in the com-
plaint inadequate, that the sections 11 and 10(b) claims failed because
there was no indication of which documents contained the alleged
fraudulent statements."9 Finally, the district court stated "that the § 10(b)
claim failed to 'identify the specific misrepresentations made and which
defendants [were] alleged to have made diem."''
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held the section 11 claim was not subject to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).'6' The plaintiff was not required to al-
lege fraud to establish a section 1 1 claim.' However, defendants argued
that plaintiffs claim was based on fraud, and Rule 9(b) was therefore
applicable.'6' The court of appeals concluded, based on the plaintiffs
complaint, that there was absolutely no allegation of fraud.'" Thus, Rule
9(b) was inapplicable to the section 11 claim pleaded by plaintiff.
155. See id. at 1249-0.
156. Id. at 1250.
157. Seeid.at 1250&n.l.
158. Id. at 1250 (explaining further that the complaint failed "to meet the particularity require-
ments of Rule 9(b) because it does not adequately identify (1) the time, place and contents of the
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions; (2) the identity of the party alleged to have made the




161. See id. at 1252.
162. See id. at 1251.
163. Cf id. at 1250.
164. Id. at 1252. The case lists the allegations under Count I of the complaint:
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The court of appeals found the section 10(b) claim was sufficient
under Rule 9(b) because the plaintiff satisfied the factual allegation re-
quirements of Rule 9(b). First, the court assessed whether plaintiff satis-
fied the time, place, and content requirements of Rule 9(b).'" The com-
plaint satisfied these requirements by stating and quoting the alleged
fraudulent statements, identifying the sources of such statements, and
even alleging facts that the alleged fraudulent statements misrepresented
or failed to disclose." The court of appeals found error in the district
court's finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy these requirements, stating
"[a] fair reading of the Complaint indicates that by cross-referencing as
allowed by Rule 10(c), it sufficiently particularizes the circumstances
constituting fraud to comply with Rule 9(b)."'6
Next, the court of appeals addressed whether the complaint satisfied
the requirement of identifying the parties who made the alleged fraudu-
lent statements. With regard to the corporate defendant, the court found
the complaint "plainly attributes the statements of the individual defen-
dants to Celestial Seasonings, Inc. itself.""' The court also looked at the
identification requirement in regard to the individual defendants at Ce-
lestial.' The court of appeals did not accept defendant's argument the
complaint violated Rule 9(b) because it failed to pair the individual state-
ments with particular individual defendants.7 Finally, the court assessed
the identity requirement with regard to the securities underwriter defen-
dants. The court of appeals found the complaint sufficiently alleged the
roles of the underwriters with regard to the alleged fraudulent statements. 7'
[D]efendants failed to make a "reasonable investigation of the statements contained in the
Registration Statements and Prospectuses"... ; that the misrepresentations "would have
been known [by the defendants] had they carried out their responsibilities with reasonable
care"... ; and that [the] defendants "failed to make a reasonable investigation.... [did
not] possess[] reasonable grounds for belief, .. . and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable




167. Id. at 1253 (citing Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Edmonds, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.
1986)).
168. Id.
169. See id. The case states that the complaint alleged the individual defendants at Celestial
were responsible for all of Celestial's alleged fraudulent statements:
The Individual Defendants had the power and the influence ... to cause Celestial
to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct alleged herein. The Individual Defen-
dants caused the publication of the materially false and misleading Prospectuses,
Registration Statements and Celestial's public filings and statements issued during
the Class Period ....
Id.
170. See id. at 1254 ("Identifying the individual sources of statements is unnecessary when the
fraud allegations arise from misstatements or omissions in group-published documents such as
annual reports, which presumably involve collective actions of corporate directors or officers.").
171. See id. ("In order to adequately allege underwriter responsibility for Celestial's statements,
the complaint must identify the specific role of the underwriters in propounding the fraudulent
statements.").
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit assessed whether plaintiff identified the
consequences of the misrepresentations or omissions." The court of ap-
peals found the complaint sufficiently described the alleged fraudulent
scheme and its consequences. " Further, the complaint detailed the his-
tory of Celestial's stock price, the inflationary impact of the fraud, and
the future decline of the stock price and rating upon Celestial's state-
ments regarding the possible termination of the Perrier agreement."
The court finally held plaintiff's action was not barred by the statute
of limitations.'" The court of appeals found the plaintiff could not have
known about the violations until the release of Celestial's Form 10-Q
that announced Celestial and Perrier were considering termination of the
Perrier agreement." Thus, plaintiffs claims were filed within one year
following publication of Celestial's 10-Q."
Based on the above holdings, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
also allowed plaintiff to bring secondary liability claims under sections
15 and 20 of the 1933 and 1934 Acts."' These claims were disallowed
under the district court's analysis.
C. Other Circuits
1. Section 11 (1933 Act) Claims & 9(b) Requirements
The Tenth Circuit's holding that Rule 9(b) does not apply to a sec-
tion 11 claim is in accord with decisions in other districts. For instance, a
district court in New York held that Rule 9(b) does not apply to a section
11 claim because fraud is not required under a 1933 Act section 11
claim.' However, a Ninth Circuit decision holds that when a section 11
172. See id. at 1254-55.
173. See id. The court stated:
[The Complaint] identifies the fraudulent statements and alleges the facts which the
statements misrepresented or failed to disclose... The Complaint specifically pleads:
mhe materially false and misleading... statements ... led investors to believe that, as a
result of the Perrier Agreement, Celestial would obtain a substantial market for its ready-
to-drink tea in the very near future, with a resulting increase in earning and profits.
The ... unlawful acts and conduct alleged herein ... maintain[ed] an artificially high
price for Celestial's shares.... By stressing the Perrier Agreement and its imminent
prospects, defendants knew that and intended that investors would look at Celestial as an
immediately viable competitor to Snapple, in the then exploding market for ready-to-
drink teas. To accomplish this illusion, the Prospectus repeatedly touted the existence of
the Perrier Agreement ....
Id.





179. See Schoenfeld v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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claim has its basis in fraud, the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)
are applicable."
2. Section 10b Claims and the Requirements of Rule 9(b)
The Tenth Circuit's application of the particularity requirements of
Rule 9(b) is also in accord with decisions in other courts."' A decision in
the Ninth Circuit required parties to meet the particularity requirements
when alleging 10(b)(5) claims."" Additionally, the Second Circuit upheld
dismissal of a complaint based on Rule 9(b) particularity requirements
because it only contained conclusory allegations of fraud."'
Further, a district court in Utah held a "securities purchaser's alle-
gations of fraud against securities issuing company and company direc-
tors to be sufficient under Rule 9(b) because they set forth specific time
period and content of misrepresentations."''M
3. Statute of Limitations for Federal Securities Claims
Though the decision only briefly addressed the issue, the one year
statute of limitations starts from the date when the party knows of, or
should have discovered the violations.'" However, it is important to note
there are varying definitions of notice that differ from that of the Tenth
Circuit."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's determination that section 11 claims under the
1933 Act, not based on fraud, do not trigger the particularity require-
ments of Rule 9(b) correctly recognizes that a section 11 claim does not
require allegations of fraud. An allegation of negligent misrepresentation
is enough to satisfy the requirements of claiming a violation under sec-
tion 1 l." Further, requiring particularity under Rule 9(b) would be in-
consistent with the policy that "liability against the issuer of a security is
180. See Stac Elec. Sec. Litig. v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996).
181. For further discussion, and an extensive list of decisions requiring pleadings with particu-
larity in cases based on fraud, see Barney J. Finberg, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Provision of Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Circumstances Constituting Fraud or
Mistake Be Stated with Particularity, 27 A.L.R. FED. 407 (1976).
182. See Clow, 89 F.3d at 1404.
183. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1252 (citing Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.
1972)).
184. See id. (citing Bradford v. Moench, 670 F. Supp. 920, 923 (D. Utah 1987)).
185. Id. at 1255 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 908 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994)).
186. For further discussion of inquiry notice, see Lawrence Kaplan, Annotation, What Consti-
tutes "Inquiry Notice " Sufficient to Commence Running of Statute of Limitations in Securities Fraud
Action- Post-Lampf Cases, 148 A.L.R. FED. 629,648-51 (1998).
187. See Schoenfeld v. Giant Stores Corp., 62 F.R.D. 348,350 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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virtually absolute, even for innocent misstatements.""' This policy is
obviously intended to protect investors and hold those who issue regis-
tered securities accountable for their misstatements and omissions. Re-
quiring plaintiffs or investors to allege section 11 claims with particular-
ity would contradict the policy of virtual absolute liability.
In regard to the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), as applied to
10(b) claims, the Tenth Circuit's decision again appears to be correct.
Allegations of 10(b)(5) violations require the plaintiff to allege fraud,
and to plead such fraud with particularity.'" Further, the purpose of the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) are to give the defendant notice of
the claim against them, and the factual allegations in support of that
claim."w Thus, requiring pleadings with particularity in cases alleging
fraud supports the purpose behind Rule 9(b). Further, requiring a plaintiff
to support claims of fraud results in many benefits. First, this require-
ment expedites resolution of the case by notifying the defendant of the
alleged false statements, thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to
defend him or herself. Further, expedition of claims will prevent backlog
in the courts. It seems sensible to require a plaintiff to support claims of
fraud when making allegations in the complaint, as opposed to using the
judicial process to adjudicate claims which could be baseless. The sever-
ity of fraud allegations should require the presence of facts that indicate
and support the fraud claim. Overall, the requirement of pleading 10(b)
claims with particularity is supported by the purpose of Rule 9(b) and by
decisions of various courts.
CONCLUSION
In Blinder, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took the opportunity
to correct the decision made by the district court.'9' The court found the
combination of mailing and publishing notice satisfied due process re-
quirements and that the six-month requirement for filing claims was ab-
solute." Further, the court established that an incompetent person is re-
quired to file for an extension within the six-month period to take ad-
vantage of the exception enumerated in the statute. 93
In Maher, the court explained the split among the circuits regarding
interpretation of the term "control."" Although the court does not spe-
188. Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
382 (1983)); see also Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1994) ("No scienter is required
for liability under § 11; defendants will be liable for innocent or negligent material misstatements or
omissions.").
189. Cf., e.g., Stac Elec. Sec. Litig. v. Clow, 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996).
190. See Schwartz, 124 F.3d at 1252.
191. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Stellatos, 124 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 1997).
192. See Blinder, 124 F.3d at 1244.
193. See id. at 1243.
194. Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.8 (10th Cir. 1998).
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cifically answer the issue, it is arguable the language in the opinion ad-
vocating a liberal approach is an indication the Tenth Circuit would rec-
ognize the controlling person's power to exercise control over the gen-
eral affairs of the primary violator as a sufficient amount of control.'"
Finally, in Schwartz the court assessed the applicability of the Rule
9(b) particularity requirements when pleading section 11 (of the 1933
Act) and section 10(b) claims (of the 1934 Act). ' The court determined
the plaintiff's complaint clearly did not allege fraud in connection with
the section 11 claim and thus, Rule 9(b) was inapplicable." In regard to
the section 10(b) claim, the court held the plaintiffs detailed complaint
satisfied the requirements of Rule 9(b) and found the cross-referencing in
the complaint to be acceptable.'"
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